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Abstract:
It is believed that the adoption of
Interorganizational systems (IOS) can enable organization to
use the information processing capabilities to reduce
coordination costs and improve performance. However, the
past researches have shown mixed results about the impact
of IOS on coordination costs. While drawing on transaction
cost analysis, this paper suggests that analyzing the
association of IOS use and coordination costs of
interorganizations should consider different levels of asset
specificity. To illustrate the explanatory power of this
analysis, this paper presents a case study from China. The
findings from the case study show that, when asset
specificity is high, IOS use can reduce coordination costs for
monitoring or cooperative purpose. While under a condition
of low asset specificity, the association between IOS use and
coordination costs is negative.
Keywords: E-commerce management, Interorganizationa
l system, Coordination cost.

I. Introduction
The recent increased interests focused on cooperative
relationships across organizational boundaries have put great
emphasis on interorganizational system (IOS) issues. IOS is
firstly defined by Cash and Konsynski [5] as “an automated
information system shared by two or more companies”.
These kinds of systems are different from intraorganizational and distributed information systems by
exchanging information across organizational boundaries.
Although a number of researchers have demonstrated that in
an interorganizational relationship, the adoption of IOS
could enable organization to use the information processing
capabilities to decrease costs and strengthen relationships
among participating organizations and as thus improve
performance [17], the past researches have also shown
mixed results about the impact of IOS on the performance of
participating organizations. For instance, Hengst and Sol
[11] have introduced transaction cost theory to study the
impact of information and communication technology (ICT)
on coordinate activities among organizations. They argue
that using of ICT can lower coordination costs and they
assert there exists a positive relationship between benefits
gained from coordination and the level of ICT applied. But
on the other hand, they acknowledge that using of ICT will
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also increase the complexity of coordination, such as
inducing more communication activities and more
information processing.
Such problem implies that we should analyze the impact
of information system in coordinating activities among
organizations under different conditions. This paper
addresses this problem by analyzing how the use of IOS
affects coordination costs under different levels of asset
specificity. Based on our analyzing method, this article
presents a case study about IOS using of a manufacturing
firm from China. From this case study, we try to investigate
the attitude of firms towards the effect of IOS use under
different environments.
This paper, in the next section, reviews the primary
contributions and arguments of transaction cost analysis in
the context of interorganizational relationships. In the
subsequent section, we present hypotheses to discuss
possible directions to the impact of IOS use on coordination
costs among firms under different conditions. Next, we
describe the case study from perspectives of managers to
explain the power of this framework. This paper ends with
conclusions and directions for future research.

II. Implications of Transaction Cost Analysis
Transaction cost analysis (TCA) has focused on the
appropriation concerns in interorganizational relationships,
which are originated from pervasive behavior uncertainty
and contracting problems. The basic assumption underlying
the TCA perspective is that the specific governance form is
based on an economizing on transaction costs. Williamson
[18] argues that the total costs of an organization are
consisted of production costs and coordination costs. An
organization should choose a proper governance form
according to a trade-off between the advantage of low
coordination costs in the case of hierarchies and low
production costs in the case of markets.
Asset specificity and environmental uncertainty are the
key dimensions of TCA that are used to predict the
boundaries of a given firm. The concept of environmental
uncertainty plays a major role in TCA which is referred to
circumstance surrounding an exchange cannot be specified
ex ante. Considering environmental uncertainty is beyond
the control of an organization, we take environmental
uncertainty being substantial as the premise of our analysis.
Asset specificity refers to physical assets, production
facilities, tools and knowledge tailored to a specific
relationship that cannot be re-deployed for other purposes
without the sacrifice of productive value. When entering an
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interorganizational relationship, participants usually have to
invest on assets with specific use only in this relationship.
As regarding the manufacturing industry, a firm should,
which is looking for appropriate supplier, make great effort
on searching and evaluating the potential partners. This may
consume a lot of capital, labors and time to establish and
maintain the cooperative relationship. Besides, the
participants might take the risk to be locked-in by special
production equipment, computer technology and related
interorganizational systems that link the buyer’s and
supplier’s scheduling and production activities. As asset
specificity becomes substantial, interdependency is
deepened and coordination is needed for safeguarding the
appropriation concerns.
Past researches have studied the association of
coordination costs and asset specificity under substantial
environmental uncertainty [2][4][9]. Their findings
suggested that substantial asset specificity would create
bilateral dependence and reduce the firm’s control over its
business partner. Therefore, the firm’s coordination costs
might increase [2][8][9]. For example, in the study of buyersupplier alliance, Anderson and Buvik [1] have confirmed
that the association between buyer’s asset specificity and
buyer’s coordination costs was positive. Figure 1 illustrates
the association between coordination cost and asset
specificity.

Asset
specificity

+

Coordinatio
n costs

FIGURE 1: Association between coordination
cost and asset specificity

III. Analysis of IOS and Coordination Cost
With the rapid development and diffusion of computers and
telecommunications in the past decades, organizations can
be able to extend the range of cooperation with other
organizations based on information systems. Initially, the
adoption of Interorganizational systems enables participating
organizations to use the information processing capabilities
to improve performance and to strengthen relationships with
other organizations sharing the IOS. Therefore, IOS are
widely adopted in industries such as airlines, banking and
transport [17]. Nowadays, it is realized that cooperation and
interdependence with other organizations are vital and
information technology is an important enabler to such
interorganizational activities. To address the influence of
IOS, some researchers have investigated the efficiency
advantages in transactions gained by IOS. Malone et al [14],
Gurbaxani and Whang [10], Clemens et al [6] point out that
using of IOS has a positive impact on the cost to coordinate
activities between organizations and leads to competitive
advantages. At the same time, other researchers have
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identified disadvantageous effects of using IOS, such as the
risks of becoming locked in with system and relationship
specific investments and the issues of changes in bargaining
power between firms [3][6][13] .
We argue that the mixed findings about the effect of IOS
on interorganizational coordination cost relate to the
influence of asset specificity and interdependency. Therefore,
the analysis of impact of IOS should be discussed under
different conditions.
There are different forces of information system to
influence the coordinative activities between firms.
Gallivant and Depledge [7] classified them as monitoring
effect and collaborative effect. The monitoring use of IOS is
to ensure trading partners will act as expected to avoid
opportunism and moral hazards. While the collaborative use
of IOS is contributed to facilitate knowledge transfer and
information share among partners. Based on such category
of effect of IOS, we establish our analytical framework
below.
When analyzing the impact of IOS use on
interorganizational coordination cost, it must be realized that
investments on IOS should enhance the level of total asset
specificity [12][16]. Because IOS is built with interface and
information exchange procedure which is proprietary to a
particular group of firms, therefore, firms wishing to join the
network often need to invest in the special hardware and
software for the system. Besides, any trading partner should
put into effort to train its personnel to operate such system
which is perhaps unique to others [13]. Support for this
argument has been provided by Nidumolu [15]. His findings
manifest that specific investments of IOS will bring about
great switching costs among firms involved in a buyer-seller
relationship. The result leads to increasing bargaining power
for the firm initiating the IOS which is against other business
partners’ favor.
According to TCA, when organization is confronted with
external uncertainty, the introduction of interorganizational
relationships may conflict with the safeguarding problem
incurred by substantial investments in specific assets [4].
Consequently, under conditions of substantial asset
specificity, IOS may be used to monitor and control over
other party’s behavior to avoid them taking advantage upon
the situation or exercising opportunistic behavior. Therefore,
gains by use of IOS are predicted to be much more dominant
than the negative influence of additional asset specificity
added by the investment of IOS.
On the other conditions of low asset specificity, analysis
of impact from IOS using is somewhat complexity. In
accordance with TCA, low asset specificity induces no
substantial safeguarding problem and interorganizational
coordination is an appropriate adaptation response to
environmental uncertainty. As a result, IOS is introduced to
facilitate the coordination among business partners.
However, under this circumstance, using of IOS may bring
about great risks to both initiators and participants of
systems. On the one hand, investment on system should
increase asset specificity of initiators which means that they
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are facing a risk to suffer from the anticipated opportunistic
behavior of other organizations. While for participants,
owing to have no control on the operation over system, they
would be locked-in by this system and might face the
possibility to be impropriated by the initiators. Therefore, to
alleviate the conflict originated from IOS, all the
organizations should put into more efforts to coordinate with
each other to achieve their common interests. Based on this
reasoning, we hypothesis:
H1: Under conditions of high asset specificity, the
association
between
investment
in
IOS
and
interorganizational coordination costs is negative.
H2: Under conditions of low asset specificity, there is a
positive association between investment in IOS and
coordination costs among trading partners.
Our hypothesized relationships between IOS use and
interorganizational coordination costs are summarized in
figure 2.
High level of
asset specificity

+

−

Coordination
costs

IOS investment
+

Low level of asset
specificity

+

FIGURE 2: Impact of IOS use on coordination
cost under different level of asset specificity

IV. A Case Study of Manufacturing Firm in
China
To examine our research analysis, firstly we make a survey
to investigate the using of IOS in Chinese manufacturing
industry. Under the pressure of global competence, more and
more firms have formed IOS-based inter-firm relationships
to achieve competitive advantage. Our survey shows that
more than 70% of firms have participated in certain kind of
interorganizational system with their business partners. Most
informants recognize they are motivated by the potential
ability of systems to access greater quantity of better quality
information. Nevertheless, they have different opinions on
the decreasing effect of coordination cost by virtue of IOS.
To illustrate our analytic method, here we select a firm
located at Xiamen, a coastal city of China, for case study.
Amoi Electronic Corporation is a multinational
electronic enterprise, which highly focuses on developing

and manufacturing products from telecommunication, digital
video and audio to IT industry. Nowadays Amoi has become
an internationally well-known leading manufacturer and
supplier of mobile phones in China. In 2003, this firm has
employed about 20,000 persons and the total sales reached
850 millions US dollar.
This firm has established its own interorganizational
information system which has designed interface with its
intra-organizational information systems. Participants of this
IOS include Amoi’s primary suppliers and distributors. For
instance, Tianma Microelectronics Corporation (TMC) is an
important supplier who provides mobile phone used liquid
crystal display (LCD) for Amoi.
Since its business partners are mostly located in other
cities all over China, managers of Amoi claim the operation
of IOS has a crucial role on reducing communication costs
and saving time of transaction. Nevertheless, considering the
ability of reducing total interorganizational coordination
costs by IOS, the situation is somewhat complexity
according to different trading partners.
When considering its supplier, Amoi recognizes TMC as
one of its most important business partners. The reason is
that mobile phone is Amoi’s most profitable kind of
production and cutting costs is just the fundamental aspect to
win competent advantage over drastic telecommunication
product market. Another reason is that the supply of screen
for mobile phone demands high degree of customization.
Therefore, Amoi has spent a huge time, labors and capital to
certify and adapt its designing and manufacturing processes
for selected LCD. That means Amoi has invested high level
of specific asset with TMC. If the supplier has any changes
on R&D or output of LCD, and if Amoi cannot collect such
information in time, that would bring about enormous
damage to the producing arrangement of Amoi. To avoid
contingency happening, or even being misappropriated,
Amoi uses IOS to monitor this supplier’s plan of R&D and
throughput. On the side of TMC, it also benefit from using
of this system. Because they can get the right demands from
Amoi beforehand, that would be useful for them to arrange
their manufacturing program. As a result, managers of Amoi
acknowledge that they have experienced savings of
coordination cost with TMC through IOS.
As for relationships with its distributors, both Amoi and
distributors have no need to invest substantial specific asset
to hold the bilateral cooperative relationships. Under such
circumstance, Amoi faces a dilemma situation. On one hand,
Amoi depends on distributors to occupy market. So this
information system can assist Amoi to monitor sale activities
of distributors’ in time. On the other hand, distributors sell
not only products of Amoi, but also the same kind products
of others. Therefore, all the two parties have some extent of
doubt. Amoi has a worry about secret leakage when using
this system. And from distributors’ perspective, they want to
keep control of their business and remain independent from
manufacturer. This leads to low level of interdependent
relationships among them. Consequently, managers of Amoi
claim that they cannot perceive significant reduction of
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coordination cost with distributors from using of IOS.

V. Conclusion and Future Research
It is pervasively believed that interorganizational systems
can play an important role in coordinating activities between
organizations. Accordingly, it is reasonable to expect that the
adoption of IOS can enable organization to use the
information processing capabilities to reduce coordination
costs and improve performance. However, the past
researches show mixed results about the impact of IOS on
the coordination costs. Some researches provide favorable
evidences to this suggestion [10][14], while other results
give no significant support to it [3][13]. This paper focuses
on the possible conditions under which IOS use can
positively affect coordination of activities between firms.
According to transaction cost analysis, under external
uncertainty environment, asset specificity becomes the
primary issues to influence coordinative patterns between
business partners. From the perspective of technology, IOS
may be used as a collaborative platform to share knowledge
and facilitate knowledge transfer between firms [7].
Moreover, organizations usually use IOS as a control
mechanism to monitor the business partners. In general, the
monitoring use of information system is applied to alleviate
risks induced by investment on specific asset, while the
cooperative use of information system is to strengthen
bilateral cooperative relationships. On the other hand,
investment on system should increase asset specificity of
initiators which means that they are facing a risk to suffer
from the anticipated opportunistic behavior of other
organizations.
This paper discusses impact of IOS use on
interorganizational cost under two situations of asset
specificity. If a high level of asset specificity exists,
organizations have to put more coordinative efforts to
maintain the cooperative relationships. Upon that, gains by
use of IOS are predicted to be much more dominant than the
negative influence of additional asset specificity added by
the investment of IOS. However, on the conditions of low
asset specificity, investment on system should increase asset
specificity. As a result, IOS use has a potential to increase
interorganizational coordination cost.
At last, a case study is presented here to investigate IOS
use in manufacturing industry from China in accordance
with our framework. The findings from the case study
demonstrate researching direction of our method.
Though the findings of this study provide valuable
insights, there are still a lot of works need for further
research. For instance, considering the shortage of case
study method, it is essential to require quantitatively
methods examining large number of IOS use from a wide
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extent. Second, because of diversified goals, abundant
development and operation of IOS, association of
information technology use and coordination cost under
economic conditions needs to be examined in a much
broader context incorporating more types of IOS.
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